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[Crlm. No. 11161.

In Bank.

Oct. 3, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP K.
FEGGANS, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Appointment and Duties of Counsel.
-Under Anders v. Oalifornia, 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493,
87 S.Ct. 1396], regardless of how frivolous an appeal may
appear and of how convinced appointed counsel for a criminal
defendant may be that there is nothing to advocate, counsel
must prepare a brief setting forth a statement of facts with
citations to the transcript, discussing the legal issues with
citations of appropriate authority, and arguing all arguable
issues, advocating changes in the law if argument can be made
in support thereof; if counsel concludes that there are no
arguable issues and the appeal is frivolous, he may limit his
brief to a statement of facts and applicable law and ask to
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[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq; Am.Jur.2d.
Criminal Law, § 321.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1048.5; [2, 3]
Criminal Law, § 374(2).
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withdraw, but must not argue the case against his client;
counsel is not allowed to withdraw until the court is satisfied
that he has discharged his duty to the court and his client; if
counsel is allowed to withdraw, defendant must be given an
opportunity to present a brief, and the court must then decide
whether the appeal is frivolous; if any contention raised is
reasonably arguable, no matter how the court feels it will
probably be resolved, the court must appoint another counsel
to argue the appeal.
[2] Id. - Evidence - Identification - Police Lineup. - The rule
requiring exclusion of identification evidence obtained at a
police showup at which the accused did not have the assistance of counsel is restricted to showups occurring after June
12, 1967, as a matter of state law.
[3] Id.-Evidence-Identiiication-Police Lineup.-Defendant ill a
criminal prosecution was not denied due process by the part a
police showup played in his conviction where two of the witnesses were shown four or five pictures including defendant
before the showup and identified him from the pictures as well
as at the showup, but there was no evidence that the pictures
were used to prime the witnesses to identify defendant, and
the showup appeared to have been conducted with scrupulous
regard for fairness.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Lewis E. Lercara, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first
degree robbery affirmed.
Phillip K. Feggans, in pro. per., and Robert N. Beechinor,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and
Appellant.
.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Michael J. Phelan,
Joyce F. Nedde and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty on two
counts of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and the
trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the term provided by law. Defendant appealed, and upon his request the
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District appointed
counsel to represent him. Counsel informed defendant and the
court by letter that after thorough study of the record,
discl,lSsion with defendant and his trial counsel, and research
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on the legal points raised, he concluded there was no merit in
the appeal. He requested and was given permission to withdraw from the case. (See In re Nash, 61 Ca1.2d 491, 495 [39
Cal.Rptr. 205, 393 P.2d 405].) The court gave defendant 30
days in which to file a brief. He filed an opening and a closing
brief and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an
opinion certified for nonpublication under rule 976, California
Rules of Court. (People v. Feggans, 1 Crim. 5220.) Defendant
filed a petition for hearing in propria persona, which we- granted because it appeared that defendant had been denied
the assistance of counsel on appeal required by Anders v.
CaUfornia, 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 8.Ct. 1396]. We
appointed new counsel to represent defendant in this court.
On December 23, 1964, Emmet Candland, the clerk in
charge of a liquor store in Berkeley was robbed. He testified
that the. robber entered the store at 7 :30 a.m. and bought a
package of gum. He left the store and returned at 8 a.m. At
that time there was a customer in the store. The robber took a
gun from a shoulder holster and told Candland to give him all
thc money in the store. Candland gave the robber $91 from
the cash register and $208 from a back room. Another
customer entered the store; the robber warned Candland and
his customers not to telephone the police and then left. Candland started to telephone the police, but while the telephone
was ringing the robber came back into the store, told Candland to get away from the telephone and warned the three
men again. Candland decided to ·wait a short time before
telephoning the police, and while he was waiting the robber
entered the store again. This time the robber hit one of the
customers on the head and took his wallet. The robber left
again and did not return. The two customers testified to the
same course of events. They had ample time to see the robber.
On December 30, 1964, Thomas Eaton, the attendant in
charge of a Chevron service station in Oakland, was robbed.
He testified that at 8 :20 p.m. the robber drove up in a Buick
Ilardtop sedan, pointed a gun at him, gave him a paper bag
and told him to put the station's money in the bag. The
robber took $107. Eaton called the police immediately after
the robber left and gave them a description of the car and the
license plate number.
Defendant was arrestcd at 8 :45 that same night when he
was found at a house in San Francisco during a police raid.
The officers had information that narcotics were sold and
stolen property received on the premises. When the officers
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found defendant in a bedroom, he dropped a gun, holster and
belt to his feet. A search incident to his arrest produced a key
that fitted a Buick sedan with the same license plate number
as the vehicle used in the service station robbery.
Candland and the two customers at the liquor store identified defendant as the robber at a police showup and at the
trial. Eaton also identified defendant at the same police
showup and at the trial.
Defendant was ably represented at the trial. He contends,
however, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on
appeal when his appointed counsel informed the court that
there was no merit in his appeal and withdrew from the case.
In Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the no-merit
letter procedure we had set forth in In re Nas"', supra, 61
Ca1.2d 491, 495, for regulating the appointment of counsel for
indigent appellants. Relying on Eskridge v. Washington
Prisoo Board, 357 U.S. 214 [2 L.Ed.2d 1269, 78 8. Ct. 1061],
and Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 [9 L.Ed.2d 892, 83 8.Ct.
768], the court concluded that the no-merit letter procedure
unconstitutionally conditioned an, indigent's right of appeal
(see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S 353 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83
S.Ct. 814] ; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 [9 L.Ed.2d
899, 83 S.Ct. 774]) and did not afford him the representation
the Constitution demands. [1] Under Anders, regardless of
how frivolous an appeal may appear and regardless of how
convinced appointed counsel as an advocate may be that there
is nothing to advocate, a no-merit letter will not suffice.
Counsel must prepare a brief to assist the court in understanding the facts and the legal issues in the case. The brief
must set forth a statement of the facts with citations to the
transcript, discuss the legal issues with citations of appropriate authority, and argue all issues that are arguable. Moreover, counsel serves both the court and his client by advocating changes in the law if argument can be made supporting
change. If counsel concludes that there are no arguable issues
and the appeal is frivolous, he may limit his brief to a statement of the facts and applicable law and may ask to withdraw
from the case, but he must not argue the case against his
client. Counsel is not allowed to withdraw from the case until
the court is satisfied that he has discharged his duty to the
court and his client to set forth adequately the facts and
issues involved. If counsel is allowed to withdraw, defendant
must be given an opportunity to present a brief, and there-
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after the court must decide for itself whether the appeal is
frivolous. (Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 741-742
[18 L.Ed.2d 493, 497-498, 87 8. Ct. 1396]; Ellis v. Uftited
States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 [2 L.Ed.2d 1060, 1061, 78 8.Ct.
974].) If any contention raised is reasonably arguable, no
matter how the court feels it will probably be resolved, the
court must appoint another counsel to argue the appeal.
Counsel appointed by the Court of Appeal in this case
raised seven points in his letter to the court, some that were
based on discussions with defendant, and others on a study of
the record. In answering each point he sought to show the
court that it had no merit. He did not set forth the relevant
facts, he cited no applicable authorities, he argued the case
against defendant, and he determined to withdraw from the
. case on the basis of the merits of the points raised, not on~ ~
whether they were frivolous. Such representation did not
constitute the assistance of counsel required by Anders. The
case has now been briefed and argued, however, .by new
counsel appointed by this court.
Defendant testified that he did not commit either robbery.
He was positively identified at the police showup and at the
trial by all the witnesses to the crimes. At the showup,
however, he did not have the assistance of counsel, a right
that it has since been determined is guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149,
87 8. Ct. 1926]; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [18
L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 8.Ct. 1951].) [2] The question presented,
therefore, is whether we should apply the rule of the Wade
and Gilbert cases to all cases still pending or restrict that
rule to showups occurring after Wade and Gilbert were
decided on June 12, 1967. Showups conducted before that date
in which defendants did not have the assistance of counsel
"threaten to be of significant quantity" (People v. Rivers,
66 Ca1.2d 1000, 1004 [59 Cal.Rptr. 851, 429 P:2d 171]),
and we conclude that the same reasons that led the Supreme
Court in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [18 L.Ed.
2d 1199, 1203, 87 8.Ct. 1967] to permit prospective operation of Wade and Gilbert as a matter of constitutional
law dictate that they also should operate prospectively as a
matter of state law. (See People v. Rivers, supra, 66 Ca1.2d
1000; People v. Charles, 66 Ca1.2d 330 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745,
425 P.2d 545] ; People v. Rollins, 65 Ca1.2d 681, [56 Cal.Rptr.
293, 423 P.2d 221].) [3] As in the Stovall case, however,
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we have scrutinized the record with respect to the showup to
determine whether defendant was denied due process by the
part the showup played in his conviction. Two of the
witnesses were shown four or five pictures including defendant's before the showup and identified him from the pictures
as well as at the showup. There is no evidence that the pictures were used to prime the witnesses to identify defendant,
and the showup itself appears to have been conducted with
scrupulous regard for fairness. The procedure did not deny
defendant due process.
We have considered and reviewed the contentions raised by
defendant in his briefs in propria persona and those raised by
counsel and find nothing to require further discussion.
The judgment is affirmed.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and SullIvan,
J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that, under state law, it should be held that
the right to counsel at a lineup, announced in United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 8.Ct. 1926], and
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 8.Ct.
1951], should not apply to cases pending when these decisions
were announced. The rule of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
[18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967], holding such decisions are
purely prospective is not binding on state courts, and should
not, in my opinion, be followed here.
I have already expressed my disagreement with the
majority of this court over their determinations on the issue
of retroactivity of criminal cases. (See my dissents in People
v. Rollins, 65 Ca1.2d 681, 693 [56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221]
and People v. Rivers, 66 Cal.2d 1000, 1005 [59 Cal.Rptr. 851,
429 P.2d 171].)
This is another in a whole series of cases dealing with the
troublesome problem of the effective date of criminal decisions
relating to constitutional rights. For many years the hi~h
court had held that its decisions in this field were whol1v
retroactive. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d
799, 83 8.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]; Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 [7 L.Ed.2d 114, 82 8.Ot. 157] ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 8.Ct. 814].) Then this
court (In re Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d

.)
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380]) and the United States Supreme Court (Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731] ; Tehan
v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 S.Ct. 459]) discovered the device of making its decisions in criminal cases
partially prospective, by holding that they applied only to
pending appeals. Then the United States Supreme Court
approached pure prospective operation when it held in J ohnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct.
1772], that the rules announced the week before in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10
A.L.R.3d 974], should apply only to cases tried after the date
Miranda was decided, although the constitutional evasion took
place before Miranda was decided. In the Johnson case the
high court also announced that its rulings in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.s. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], were
prospective in that they applied only to cases tried after
Escobedo was decided. Then in Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388
U.S. 293, the court reached pure prospective operation by
holding that the lineup rules announced in United States v.
Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218, and Gilbert v. California, supra,
388 U.S. 263, should apply only to cases where the lineup was
held after June 12, 1967, the date on which these caSes were
decided'. '
So far as federal law is concerned those cases are, of course,
binding upon us. But in adopting its various rules of partially or wholly prospective operation the high court was
careful to announce that the states were free to adopt more
stringent rules of retroactivity if they so desired. (Johnson v.
New Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719.) The California Supreme
Court quickly accepted this invitation when it held in People
v. Rollins, supra, 65 Cal.2d 681, that we would not follow the
high court as to the effective date of Escobedo v. Illinois,
supra, 378 U.S. 478, holding, contrary to the United States
Supreme Court, that it applied to pending appeals as a matter
of state law, but would follow it as to the effective date of
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436.
The attitude of this court, as a matter of state law, toward
retroactivity was clearly demonstrated when it was faced with
the question whether the rules announced in People v.
Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265],
applied to cases tried before Aranda but pending on appeal
when that case was decided. In People v. Charles, 86 Cal.2d
330 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545], we held that the newly
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discovered rules, not involving federal constitutional rights,
applied to all cases not yet final when Aranda was decided.
Thus, we have been reluctant in the past to follow the
Supreme Court of -the United States on the issue of retroactivity. We should be reluctant to follow it on the lineup
problem. We should not blindly follow it on that issue. In my
opinion, to be consistent, the very least we should hold is that
Wade and Gilbert apply to pending appeals. These cases deal
with the fundamental and constitutional right of counsel. If
Escobedo (which involves the right to counsel at interrogation), under state law, is to apply to pending cases, then the
right of counsel involved in the lineup cases should also apply
to- pending appeals. If, under state law, the rules announced
in Aranda, are to apply to pending cases, then the more
important right here involved should also apply to pending
cases.
There is no consistency in what this court is doing on this
isSue. Certainly no general principle has been announced that
will settle whether criminal law decisions are to be retroactive
or prospective. What the court is doing is to leave that determination to be made case by case. That, in my opinion, is not
an intelligent way for the law t<~ develop.
I would hold that the lineup' rule, under state law, is retroactive at least to the extent that it applies to pending cases.
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